Chinese fighter intercepts Navy Poseidon

[BridgeTroll]

Looks like we finally have a much needed agreement regarding air to air intercepts with the Chinese... I hope it works...

http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/u-s-and-china-agree-to-rules-for-air-to-air-intercepts-1733269855

With President Xi Jinping in the U.S. for a state dinner, hardcore diplomacy is underway trying to solve some very big problems — one of them relating to the sometimes dangerous intercepts of American surveillance aircraft operating in international airspace. Now, it looks like Beijing and Washington have come up with a way of potentially stopping such incidents in the future.

The problem is nothing new, as Chinese jets aggressively maneuvered around U.S. military aircraft operating near the Chinese territory for years. On April 1, 2001 a collision between a U.S. Navy EP-3 Aeries spy aircraft and a Chinese J-8 fighter made for a huge, Cold War-like diplomatic flash point. Almost 15 years later, aggressive Chinese intercepts are still a major concern, and the problem seems to be getting worse as Chinese-U.S. relations sputter.

With this in mind, both sides have supposedly agreed to new set of rules for air-to-air intercepts. These include everything from the way each aircraft is to physically perform in close proximity to another to the proper radio frequencies to use during distress calls. Even the crews' gestures and radio language will be tightly controlled under this new agreement.

A new emergency hotline will also be set up to provide communications between high-level military personnel in each country at a moment's notice. The hope is that by having such a capability in place, a situation or misunderstanding can be de-escalated before becoming highly volatile.

You can find drafts of both agreements http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/US-CHINA_AIR_ENCOUNTERS_ANNEX_SEP_2015.pdf and http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/US-CHINA_CRISIS_COMMUNICATIONS_ANNEX_SEP_2015.pdf.

It will be interesting to see if these initiatives are followed once put to the test. If they are, it would mark a significant development in U.S.-Chinese military relations. If they are not closely adhered to by the Chinese, it would be a clear sign that they have no intention of following through with any military-to-military agreements. Such a failed test would be especially troubling, considering that even larger issues like cyber attacks, hacking and electronic intellectual property theft — all tactics that China has been deploying with fervor over the last decade — may not be solvable via written agreements. As such, the only other option would be military inaction or reaction, both of which could end badly for both parties.

[spuwho]

From the WSJ:

http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-12-mile-naval-test-1444348609

A 12-Mile South China Sea Test

Senior American officials leaked word this week that the U.S. Navy will soon conduct freedom-of-navigation operations within 12 nautical miles of China's newly built artificial islands in the South China Sea's Spratly archipelago. This means the Administration may finally be willing to challenge Beijing's baseless sovereignty claims in distant waters.

The caveat is that leaks from this Administration are unreliable signals of intent. Before Chinese leader Xi Jinping visited Washington last month, U.S. officials told reporters they were considering sanctioning China for cyber abuses. Sanctions never materialized, as Messrs. Obama and Xi announced a toothless bilateral pledge not to hack trade secrets.

China's island-building dates at least to 2013, and last year the Philippines revealed evidence of Chinese military facilities under construction at Johnson South Reef. China illegally claims air and sea sovereignty around the islands by warning planes and ships away. In May the Pentagon assessed that China had built 2,000 acres of new land. With China's neighbors growing alarmed, Pentagon chief Ashton Carter said the U.S. "will fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows, as we do all around the world."

But not where such operations were needed most, within 12 miles of China's artificial islands. China went on dredging and building, even after it said it was stopping. By August it had amassed nearly 3,000 acres of new Spratly territory.

Washington's hesitant response has allowed controversy to build around freedom-of-navigation missions that should be routine. Beijing's strategy in the South China Sea is to bully its neighbors and achieve regional hegemony through coercive means short of war. Turning peaceful naval patrols into diplomatic hot potatoes is exactly the sort of change Beijing seeks.

And right on time on Friday, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying said China is "seriously concerned" about the reports of U.S. Navy action. China "will absolutely not permit any country to infringe on China's territorial waters and airspace in the Spratly Islands in the name of 'protecting freedom of navigation and overflight.'" she said.

Such threats are all the more reason for the U.S. to defend international naval norms, and to make this the beginning of a persistent challenge to China's false claims. The U.S. has put too much hope in a "code of conduct" led by the 10-country Association of Southeast Asian Nations, a group that has been routinely manipulated and stymied by Beijing. The better U.S. course is to start joint maritime patrols with willing partners, possibly including Japan, the Philippines, Australia, Singapore, Vietnam and others.

Two decades ago, then Philippines President Fidel Ramos said the Spratly Islands would be "a litmus test of whether China as a great power intends to play by international rules, or make its own." Beijing has shown that it scorns those rules. The question is whether the U.S. intends to do what is necessary to uphold them.

[Adam White]

LOL.. "baseless sovreignty claims in distant waters". I guess the "liberal media" isn't the only one that suffers from bias.

China's claims over these islands are as sound as those of any other country.

[BridgeTroll]

A view from Australia...

http://www.smh.com.au/comment/peter-hartcher-south-china-sea-us-dips-its-toe-in-troubled-waters-but-its-too-little-too-late-20151019-gkczpm.html

South China Sea: US dips its toe in troubled waters, but it's too little, too late

Date October 20, 2015 - 12:08AM

The countries of the Asia-Pacific are tensing for the moment, expected any day now, when the US navy confronts China's claim to own the islands in the middle of the world's busiest shipping route.

You might have heard some people dismiss the tensions over the ownership of contested reefs and outcrops in the South China Sea as trivial, arguments over "a few rocks in the middle of the ocean".

In fact this is momentous, a defining power struggle between the reigning world power and the rising one. The history of our region is being written in each decision from Washington and Beijing.

Every government in the region, and around the world, is watching closely and asking three central questions. One, does the US have the strength of will to uphold the international order? Two, just how aggressive is the new China going to be? Three, which country should we be aligning ourselves with now? The Chinese took a string of contested reefs and rocks in the South China Sea, built them up into islands, and have started adding ports, runways, garrisons and lighthouses. Beijing claims them to be "indisputable sovereign territory" although this  is vigorously disputed by the other countries that claim  parts of them: the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei.

The US Navy is now reportedly planning to sail right into the 12nautical mile zone that defines territorial limits around one of the major points of dispute, the Spratly Islands, defying the Chinese claim and asserting freedom of navigation for international vessels.

Beijing has warned that this would be a "grave mistake for the United States to use military means to challenge China".  The official Xinhua newsagency said last week that "China has every right to defend its rights and strategic interests, and will respond to any provocation appropriately and decisively".

Beijing would have no option but to build up its defences on the islands, Xinhua said. Indeed, an unnamed Chinese military official told Time magazine: "There are 209 land features still unoccupied in the South China Sea and we could seize them all ... and we could build on them in 18 months."

China is very consciously implementing a new national strategy of assertiveness towards the rest of the world. The late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping set out the national stance in the 1990s as one of "hide your brightness, bide your time". It was a philosophy of restraint to allow China to concentrate on an economic and military build-up.

But China's current president, Xi Jinping, has decided that is time to show China's brightness and no longer bide its time. In October 2013, he convened the highest level meeting on foreign policy since the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949, according to a leading Chinese scholar, Yan Xuetong.

At that meeting, he promulgated a new national strategy – "strive for achievement" as China seeks national restoration as the greatest power in Asia.    But what Xi calls striving for achievement, other countries consider to be coercive diplomacy.

Barack Obama in June described it as "throwing elbows and pushing people out of the way".

Beijing ignored him. China's assertiveness was vindicated when the US did nothing in response. China had achieved what traditional strategy considers the ultimate in warfare: "Defeating the enemy without ever fighting," as Sun Tzu's The Art of War puts it.

But now, after protracted internal American government debate, US media report that the US Navy is on the brink of acting, and the region awaits. The US, like Australia, takes no side in the territorial dispute but insists that it not be settled forcibly.

Ministers from Australia and the US discussed this issue at length in the annual AUSMIN consultations last week. Julie Bishop told the media that Washington and Canberra were "on the same page" on the matter of freedom of navigation.

But, contrary to some media reports, participants tell me that the US proposed no specific measures and Australia agreed to take no specific measures of its own. To now, the US has not decided precisely what it will do.

To sail into the 12 nautical mile territorial claim is something that the US Navy has never done. To do it now would be seen to be provocative, and aimed squarely at Beijing.

Yan, who is a sometime adviser to the government in Beijing, says that "the competition for power is a zero sum game and structural conflicts between the rising power and the existing power are inevitable.

In a telling phrase, he adds: "When the strategy of annexation is not available, the competition will turn to how to make more allies." For now, Beijing seems to consider annexation to be very available.

But the US and China are not the only great powers with a deep national interest in the question of who controls the world's busiest shipping route and the Asia's central maritime hub.   At  the weekend, Japan and India joined the US in naval exercises centred on hunting and killing submarines. It was important to have "naval partners who are like-minded friends and allies" said a Pentagon official, Amy Searight.

The Chinese worry deeply that there is an incipient alignment of these three great powers against China. Of course, this is something that Beijing can influence by its behaviour. They will align against China if they see it as necessary to manage Chinese aggression.

The three big questions remain to be answered in the days ahead. Does the US have the strength of will to uphold the international order? Just how aggressive is the new China going to be? And which country should we be aligning ourselves with now?     


Read more: http://www.smh.com.au/comment/peter-hartcher-south-china-sea-us-dips-its-toe-in-troubled-waters-but-its-too-little-too-late-20151019-gkczpm.html#ixzz3p1VSye00
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[BridgeTroll]

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/could-court-case-strip-china-its-south-china-sea-claims-14558

Could this Court Case Strip China of Its South China Sea Claims?

From November 24 to 30, the UN-backed Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) convened in The Hague to hear oral arguments on merit [4] in the The Republic of Philippines v The People's Republic of China [5] case over competing claims in the South China Sea. After ruling at the end of October that the international tribunal had the jurisdiction [6] to hear the case, the first round of arguments saw the Philippines present their claims to the tribunal supported by evidence and witnesses [7]. The PCA is currently expected to hand down a final judgment in the case as early as mid-2016, and that judgment—even though it will focus narrowly on the specific issue of competing Chinese–Philippine entitlements—is widely anticipated to discredit the majority [8] of China's claims in the South China Sea.

If the tribunal does hand down an unfavorable judgment for China, what happens next? The PCA has no enforcement mechanism, so to what lengths will the Philippines, the U.S. and other stakeholders go to ensure China abides by the ruling? The South China Sea disputes are far from being just a collection of bilateral issues, so what happens post-arbitration in the South China Sea has serious implications for the future of the regional order. With June 2016 only six months away, let's take a quick look at three potential ways the situation could play out if China is handed an unfavorable ruling.

1: China abides by the ruling

The ideal situation (for the Philippines, other claimant states, and the US) would see China abide by an unfavorable ruling. Under Article 288 (4) of UNCLOS [9], the ruling of the tribunal is binding, even with China's non-participation in the tribunal proceedings [8], and as a UNCLOS signatory, China has an obligation to act in good faith by upholding whatever ruling the tribunal reaches. Abiding by the ruling would therefore demonstrate that China intends to respect and uphold international law, something naturally reassuring to its nervous neighbors.

As desirable as it would be, China is highly unlikely to abide by such a ruling. It would be extremely difficult at home for a legitimacy challenged CCP [10] to loudly proclaim sovereignty over the islands for decades, vow to uphold and protect China's territorial integrity and then turn around to admit that UNCLOS has ruled their claims are null and void. Abiding by such a ruling might even call into question China's commitment to upholding its other 'core interests' (including Taiwan, Xinjiang and Tibet). For a party that has relied on the twin pillars of economic growth and a strong nationalist message for its legitimacy post-Tiananmen, abiding by the ruling will be nearly impossible for the CCP.

2: China doesn't abide by the ruling, but the status quo stays somewhat the same

A more likely situation is that China will ignore the ruling, and continue to dismiss the entire tribunal proceedings and any subsequent ruling [11]. That second scenario would see China ignore the ruling but the status quo remain effectively the same, with the region judging the risks of forcing China to uphold the ruling to be too high. China would continue its drive to exercise de facto control over the South China Sea. If China doesn't abide by the PCA's ruling and the international community doesn't step in to uphold it, the ramifications of that scenario would be, in effect, an international acknowledgement that China plays by its own rules. Hopes of engaging China as a responsible stakeholder in the current regional and international orders would be dealt a heavy blow.

3: China doesn't abide by the ruling, and the US or a coalition of countries in the region take a stand

A third scenario that could eventuate is that China ignores the ruling, and the United States—either alone or in tandem with other regional countries—ramps up international pressure on China to comply with the ruling. Such a situation could see a dramatic increase in U.S. 'Freedom of Navigation' operations through the South China Sea, with other countries joining in. International support for the Philippines to enjoy its legal entitlements in the South China Sea would escalate dramatically. The idea that countries like the United States and Australia have sheltered behind previously—that they take no position on who owns which islands—would become much harder to sustain. Furthermore, the Philippines' claims in the South China Sea may well be covered by the U.S.-Philippines Security Treaty [12], risking U.S. military escalation.

Whatever judgment the tribunal hands down as early as June 2016 will represent a watershed moment: how China responds to the ruling and the subsequent actions of the international community will shape the future global order. Will we see the continuation of a system based on international law and norms, or the emergence of a more Thucydian world where the strong do what they want and the weak suffer what they must? A major decision point looms before us in the South China Sea.

[Tacachale]

Good article, thanks. It does seem unlikely China would abide by any ruling that doesn't involve China getting everything it wants, but there's hope. They'd hurt themselves in the long run. If they don't abide by the ruling, hopefully we support the other countries in taking a stand.

[finehoe]

...the United States—either alone or in tandem with other regional countries—ramps up international pressure on China to comply with the ruling. Such a situation could see a dramatic increase in U.S. 'Freedom of Navigation' operations through the South China Sea, with other countries joining in.

And this would accomplish exactly what?  China still has their bases.

Furthermore, the Philippines' claims in the South China Sea may well be covered by the U.S.-Philippines Security Treaty, risking U.S. military escalation.

Would the US risk war with China over a Philippine claim?  I wouldn't take that bet.

[BridgeTroll]

...the United States—either alone or in tandem with other regional countries—ramps up international pressure on China to comply with the ruling. Such a situation could see a dramatic increase in U.S. 'Freedom of Navigation' operations through the South China Sea, with other countries joining in.

And this would accomplish exactly what?  China still has their bases.

Furthermore, the Philippines' claims in the South China Sea may well be covered by the U.S.-Philippines Security Treaty, risking U.S. military escalation.

Would the US risk war with China over a Philippine claim?  I wouldn't take that bet.

I wouldn't take that bet either but it would clearly demonstrate that China does not care much about their neighbors claims and that it should not be trusted.  If I was Taiwan... I would sit up and take notice... If I was Vietnam... I would sit up and take notice... If I was Australia, India, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia and many others... I would take notice.  My bet is these counties would be more willing to accept US bases or landing rights or port calls.

[finehoe]

I wouldn't take that bet either but it would clearly demonstrate that China does not care much about their neighbors claims and that it should not be trusted.  If I was Taiwan... I would sit up and take notice... If I was Vietnam... I would sit up and take notice... If I was Australia, India, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia and many others... I would take notice.  My bet is these counties would be more willing to accept US bases or landing rights or port calls.

I don't think any of those countries are under any delusions about China.  And don't they all (except maybe India) already accept US bases or landing rights or port calls?

[BridgeTroll]

I wouldn't take that bet either but it would clearly demonstrate that China does not care much about their neighbors claims and that it should not be trusted.  If I was Taiwan... I would sit up and take notice... If I was Vietnam... I would sit up and take notice... If I was Australia, India, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia and many others... I would take notice.  My bet is these counties would be more willing to accept US bases or landing rights or port calls.

I don't think any of those countries are under any delusions about China.  And don't they all (except maybe India) already accept US bases or landing rights or port calls?

Who said anything about delusions?  What may be delusional is that China appears to think the neighbors in the SCS will accept China's version of might makes right...

Just found this today as a matter of fact...

http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/us-singapore-agree-spy-plane-deployment-amid-south-china-sea-tensions/

Singapore has granted the United States permission to fly surveillance aircraft out of its territory.

In a joint statement after their meeting in Washington, D.C. on Monday, U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter and visiting Singapore Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen welcomed the inaugural deployment of the U.S. P-8 Poseidon aircraft to Singapore from December 7 to December 14.........

[finehoe]

Who said anything about delusions? 

...it would clearly demonstrate that China does not care much about their neighbors claims and that it should not be trusted... 

They would be delusional if they didn't already realize this, which as I said, I'm pretty sure they do.

[Tacachale]

...the United States—either alone or in tandem with other regional countries—ramps up international pressure on China to comply with the ruling. Such a situation could see a dramatic increase in U.S. 'Freedom of Navigation' operations through the South China Sea, with other countries joining in.

And this would accomplish exactly what?  China still has their bases.

Furthermore, the Philippines' claims in the South China Sea may well be covered by the U.S.-Philippines Security Treaty, risking U.S. military escalation.

Would the US risk war with China over a Philippine claim?  I wouldn't take that bet.

I wouldn't take that bet either but it would clearly demonstrate that China does not care much about their neighbors claims and that it should not be trusted.  If I was Taiwan... I would sit up and take notice... If I was Vietnam... I would sit up and take notice... If I was Australia, India, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia and many others... I would take notice.  My bet is these counties would be more willing to accept US bases or landing rights or port calls.

What it accomplishes is on the one hand, the ability to continue peaceful operations though the area, and on the other, pressuring China to ease off its claims that other countries can't sail through the area. When the U.S. held a "Freedom of Navigation" operation recently, China whined about it, but then opened up talks with the U.S. Navy, which was a good result (including for China in the long term).

[spuwho]

China has already notified everyone that they will not abide by the ruling of the court. They didnt even send counsel to some of the preliminary hearings.

It wasnt until jurisdiction was established that they actually started appearing and arguing against the petition by the Phillippines.

If China used its might diplomatically to work on a joint treaty with the nations involved, which usually entails opening their checkbook, they might get more cooperation.

But in this case, if they have to pay, they want to call all the shots too.

So by placing themselves on these artificial islands. They improve their seat at the table before hand.

[finehoe]

What it accomplishes is on the one hand, the ability to continue peaceful operations though the area, and on the other, pressuring China to ease off its claims that other countries can't sail through the area.

I just saying that in the context of the article

3: China doesn't abide by the ruling, and the US or a coalition of countries in the region take a stand

continuing what we're already doing isn't much of a "stand".

[BridgeTroll]

http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/did-australia-secretly-conduct-its-own-freedom-of-navigation-operation-in-the-south-china-sea/

Did Australia Secretly Conduct Its Own Freedom of Navigation Operation in the South China Sea?
An accidental scoop by a BBC reporter suggests so.

By Shannon Tiezzi December 16, 2015

On December 14, the BBC ran a story chronicling reporter Rupert Wingfield-Hayes' attempt to fly near some of China's artificial islands in a Cessna. The piece is fascinating in its own right – not least for its implication that Wingfield-Hayes was basically conducting his own mini-freedom of navigation operation. When Chinese radio broadcasts warn the aircraft away, Wingfield-Hayes convinces his pilots to ignore the warnings: "We are not breaking any laws, the Chinese are not going to shoot us down. You must hold your course, and you must respond to them and tell them we are a civilian aircraft flying in international airspace."

But toward the end of the piece is an inadvertent scoop by Wingfield-Hayes. While flying over the South China Sea, his plane's radio picks up a broadcast from another source:

China Navy, China Navy. We are an Australian aircraft exercising international freedom of navigation rights, in international airspace in accordance with the international civil aviation convention, and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – over.

Though Wingfield-Hayes says his aircraft was warned away repeatedly (and aggressively) by the Chinese navy, he didn't catch any Chinese response to the Australian broadcast. Details released later provided a specific date for the radio transmission (November 25) and identified the aircraft as an RAAF AP-3C Orion.

As Wingfield-Hayes explains, Australia has never publicly announced its own freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. Yet here was a radio transmission that suggested Australia was doing just that. In response to the highly-publicized U.S. FONOP near Subi Reef in late October, Australia expressed strong support for the rights of freedom of navigation and overflight, but was coy about whether it would conduct its own such operations, either independently or with the United States.

ABC picked up the story from there, including a clip of the audio recording from Wingfield-Hayes. According to ABC, the Australian government still has not announced that it undertook a freedom of navigation operation in the South China Sea. The Department of Defense confirmed some of the details, however, telling ABC that "a Royal Australian Air Force AP-3C Orion was conducting a routine maritime patrol in the region as part of Operation GATEWAY from 25 November to 4 December."

"Operation Gateway is Australia's enduring contribution to the preservation of regional security and stability in South East Asia," according to the Australian Ministry of Defense. It consists of "maritime surveillance patrols in the North Indian Ocean and South China Sea" by the Australian Defense Force. There is no mention of preserving freedom of navigation as a primary purpose; rather, the operation is described as "part of the support to Australia's efforts to counter people smuggling in the region."

If Australia did conduct a patrol aimed at establishing freedom of navigation rights in the South China Sea (and, critically, there's no clarity on exactly where the AP-3C Orion was flying at the time, and whether it entered the 12 nautical mile zone around any Chinese-held features), it did so as quietly as possible. Compare that to the U.S. FONOP of October 27, which was preceded by months of built-up anticipation, based on both public and anonymous comments from U.S. officials.

There's no question as to which approach China would prefer – which explains its relatively muted response to the reports. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei answered a question on the possible Australian FONOP by emphasizing China's stance that "there is no problem with navigation and overflight freedom in the South China Sea."

"We hope other countries, especially those outside the region, will watch their words and actions, rather than bringing up troubles and deliberately complicating the situation in the South China Sea," Hong continued. As Chinese official critiques go, that's about as mild as they come. In response to the U.S. FONOP, remember, China accused the United States of having "threatened China's sovereignty and security interests... and endangered regional peace and stability."

Meanwhile, the United States itself is apparently not planning to conduct another FONOP near China's artificial islands in 2015, despite earlier reports to the contrary. Reuters cites U.S. defense officials as saying that the next such operation was likely to come in January.