U.S. official resigns over war in Afghanistan

[Dog Walker]

BT, I am suggesting that we can keep the Taliban and other bad guys from organizing and having bases for terrorists without a large presence throughout the country.  We overthrew the Taliban and destroyed the al Quida bases with just a few hundred special forces, a cooperative tribal ally and air power.  I think we need to go back to that profile and goal and stop trying to drag a primitive, tribal society into something resembling the West.

[JaxBorn1962]

BT, I am suggesting that we can keep the Taliban and other bad guys from organizing and having bases for terrorists without a large presence throughout the country.  We overthrew the Taliban and destroyed the al Quida bases with just a few hundred special forces, a cooperative tribal ally and air power.  I think we need to go back to that profile and goal and stop trying to drag a primitive, tribal society into something resembling the West.

Very Good Post to quote rush DITTO!

[Cricket]

BT, I am suggesting that we can keep the Taliban and other bad guys from organizing and having bases for terrorists without a large presence throughout the country. 

Al Qaeda has bases in Somalia, Indonesia, Yemen and parts of West Africa, among other countries. Are you suggesting that we also send troops to those countries to stop the bad guys from organizing?

[civil42806]

BT, I am suggesting that we can keep the Taliban and other bad guys from organizing and having bases for terrorists without a large presence throughout the country.  We overthrew the Taliban and destroyed the al Quida bases with just a few hundred special forces, a cooperative tribal ally and air power.  I think we need to go back to that profile and goal and stop trying to drag a primitive, tribal society into something resembling the West.

Very Good Post to quote rush DITTO!

spare me

[BridgeTroll]

Al Qaeda has bases in Somalia, Indonesia, Yemen and parts of West Africa, among other countries. Are you suggesting that we also send troops to those countries to stop the bad guys from organizing?

No.  But the situation is dfferent.  Yemen has a legitimate government(though hostile) and does not allow these entities to operate freely.  Somalia has no government and we have attacked al qaida as needed.  Al qaida in Indonesia and west Africa is not allowed to operate openly.  Same for Pakistan.

[Dog Walker]

With the money we are spending on troops and "nation building" in Afghanistan we could probably buy a lot of very good intelligence on terrorist operations around the world.  It's working in Somalia.

[BridgeTroll]

For me... it all comes back to this...

are you prepared for the Taliban to once again rule and dominate the populace?  Are you ready for them to invite al qaeda back to safe havens free from Pakistani army attacks?  If we are gone... how do we keep terrorists from making training camps and bases free from attack and interference?

My answers are... No, No, we will not.  What are everyone elses answers?

Additionally... I hate the "Nation Building" term.  We are attempting to stabilize the government so it can build and defend itself.  Difficult task... no doubt. 

[JaxBorn1962]

BT, I am suggesting that we can keep the Taliban and other bad guys from organizing and having bases for terrorists without a large presence throughout the country.  We overthrew the Taliban and destroyed the al Quida bases with just a few hundred special forces, a cooperative tribal ally and air power.  I think we need to go back to that profile and goal and stop trying to drag a primitive, tribal society into something resembling the West.

Very Good Post to quote rush DITTO!

spare me

Ok

[Dog Walker]

BT, the point is that there isn't any "there" there.  There are some officials in Kabul.  They might even be the government of Kabul, but the certainly are not the government of Afghanistan.  Their is a tribal society i.e. first allegiance is to the family, the clan then the tribe.  Most of the people in that region have no recognition of any government other than that.  "Are you an Aghani?" "No, I am a Pashtun of the XYZ clan."

The only "government" in such areas are simply the best organized thugs with the most guns.  That's what the Taliban was and wants to be again.  The government to most people like those in Afghanistan and indeed in the "tribal" areas of Pakistan are just "those guys" who come in with guns and take money from us and we don't like them for it.

[BridgeTroll]

The only "government" in such areas are simply the best organized thugs with the most guns.  That's what the Taliban was and wants to be again.

So this can be be accomplished with less of a presence in the country?  Or are you conceding that the Taliban will take over... that al qaida will be back and we just slowly throttle back until we are gone. 

[Dog Walker]

No, I suggest we hold some bases there and nearby with special forces, drones, etc. on call and constant intelligence surveillance so that when the bad guys start to organize again and cause us trouble that we then whack them.  We did this in the first place and can do it again. (I hope!)

I think we are creating enemies there by our overwhelming presence and we would be better off if we backed off a bit and played one group off against another and supported those who support us and did our work for us. 

Holding elections in a place like that, as recent events have shown, is just a joke.

Look at Kurdistan as an example.  We did it there successfully

[FayeforCure]

Is A Third Surge Needed in Afghanistan?

The real question we should be asking in Afghanistan is not "Do we need a surge?" but rather "Do we need a third surge?" The number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan in January 2008 was 26,607. Over the next six months, the Bush administration raised the total to 48,250. President Bush described this policy as "the quiet surge," and he made the standard arguments about the need for a counterinsurgency capacityâ€"the troops had to not only fight the Taliban but protect the Afghan population, strengthen and train the Afghan Army and police, and assist in development.

In January 2009, another 3,000 troops, originally ordered by President Bush, went to Afghanistan in the first days of the Obama presidency. In February, responding to a request from the commander in the field, Obama ordered an additional 17,000 troops into the country. In other words, over the past 18 months, troop levels in Afghanistan have almost tripled. An additional 40,000 troops sent in the next few months would mean an almost 400 percent increase in U.S. troops since 2008. (The total surge in Iraq, incidentally, was just over 20,000 troops.) It is not dithering to try to figure out why previous increases have not worked and why we think additional ones would.



In fact, focusing on the number of additional troops needed "misses the point entirely," says a senior military officer who has studied Afghanistan up close. "The key takeaway" from his assessment "is the urgent need for a significant change to our strategy and the way we think and operate." That officer is Gen. Stanley McChrystal, and that assessment is his now famous 66-page memo to the secretary of defense. The quotes are from the third paragraph. These changes in strategy have just begun.

To understand how U.S. troops had been fighting in Afghanistan, consider the Battle of Wanat. On July 13, 2008, a large number of Taliban fighters surrounded an American base in the village of Wanat in the southeastern corner of Afghanistan. After a few hours of fierce fighting, nine American soldiers lay dead, the largest number killed in a single engagement in years. The strategic question surely is, "Why were we in Wanat in the first place?" Tom Ricks, the superb defense expert, points out that the area around Wanat is a mountainous region with few people, many of them hostile to outsiders. So, he asks, "Why are we putting our fist in a hornet's nest?"

In fact, General McChrystal has since pulled U.S. forces out of Wanat. Washington Post reporter Greg Jaffe, reporting on the town a year later, concluded recently that "ceding territory to the Taliban is more effective than maintaining small, vulnerable bases in forbidding terrain. In the past several weeks, U.S. commanders, based about six miles outside the village, have detected growing friction between Wanat residents and the Taliban commanders responsible for last year's attack." In other words, let the Taliban try to set up bases in these remote areas with prickly locals. NATO forces can then periodically disrupt the Taliban rather than the other way around.

http://www.newsweek.com/id/219380

As Hoh says:
"The Mission is Not Worth The Human Cost"