Let’s Get Back to the Basics at JTA

[fsu813]

JEA was a multi-billion dollar scheme. JTA is $40 million in the hole. Not even comparable.

It'll come out with due time, but the NAVI/U2C scheme cost JTA way more than $40M. You also have to consider the sheer opportunity cost that JTA has wasted & how brazen this entire thing has been. The entire department was just set back more than a decade. This whole scheme is nearly a decade running now... I don't think it's crazy to suggest this is a JEA level story at all. How much do you value the lost Emerald Trail contract? Add it all up & the loss here is easily $100M+.

At the end of the day, JEA was/is still mostly functional. JTA will need a complete reset. What value do you put on that?

JTA screwing up the trail funding, while arguably incompetent, is unrelated to anything being alleged.

[CityLife]

One thing to keep in mind is that we still have absolutely zero idea what the final findings are of JTA's scandal.  There are some very specific requests that look like there are one or more whistleblowers pointing to investigators directly to issues, but it is also very possible that more whistleblowers come forward and investigators find our more after receiving materials from the subpoena. There are several red flags in the subpoena that, depending on what the records show, could turn this into a much larger scandal.

That said, I don't think you can really compare it to JEA. The PUP scheme is almost impossible to match in terms of sheer scale, greed, and audacity. The more interesting comparison may ultimately be the condition the two agencies were left in. Nat Ford's tenure could end up leaving JTA in a considerably worse financial position than JEA or COJ would have been in had the JEA sale actually gone through.

I've said this before and still believe it: selling JEA to NextEra/FPL could have been an enormous financial opportunity for Jacksonville. The people running JEA got greedy and blew it with the PUP scheme.

The NextEra offer would have generated approximately $6.45 billion in net proceeds for Jacksonville. Under Curry's proposal, roughly $2.2 billion would have been used to eliminate City debt, leaving approximately $4.25 billion available for investment or other public purposes. At the time, JEA was contributing roughly $120 million annually to the City's general fund. It would take more than 35 years of $120 million annual contributions just to equal $4.25 billion and that ignores the investment earnings that $4.25 billion could have generated. On top of that, eliminating approximately $2.2 billion in City debt was projected to save roughly $240 million annually in debt service.

And it is not just beneficial to the City as an financial windfall. Jax residents probably would have probably received better utility services. FPL is more aggressive at retrofitting existing neighborhoods with undergrounding than JEA is and their utility rates are currently slightly lower than JEA's are.

Even with the PUP, Jax would have been incredibly cash flush with no debts and able to make some major capital investments. MOSH funding? No problem. Larger match to get UF here quicker? No worries. Incentives for corporate relocations? Easy.

JTA on the other hand, post Ford/NAVI/U2C is in horrendous shape.

So basically, the JEA scheme is likely worse as a criminal fraud case, but JTA is possibly a worse mismanagement of a public agency.

[jaxlongtimer]

Like at this point, I almost wonder if the best plan is to truly dissolve what is JTA, develop a new transit agency, route the 1/2 cent sales tax they get to them, and have them take over transit only. Eliminate the highway portion....other cities don't have their transit organization doing highways and somehow they build bridges.

This is essentially what I also advocated for in a prior post.  JTA should only be for MASS transit which should be defined as moving a minimum number of people per vehicle, per hour on a given mode, and/or along those lines. No half dozen to a dozen people at a time, a few times in a day.

All road building should go to another agency or the City's public works department.

JEA was a multi-billion dollar scheme. JTA is $40 million in the hole. Not even comparable.

It'll come out with due time, but the NAVI/U2C scheme cost JTA way more than $40M. You also have to consider the sheer opportunity cost that JTA has wasted & how brazen this entire thing has been. The entire department was just set back more than a decade. This whole scheme is nearly a decade running now... I don't think it's crazy to suggest this is a JEA level story at all. How much do you value the lost Emerald Trail contract? Add it all up & the loss here is easily $100M+.

At the end of the day, JEA was/is still mostly functional. JTA will need a complete reset. What value do you put on that?

If you look at actual CASH lost, JEA was fortunately stopped short of actually losing cash on its corrupt scheme.  (The real CASH scandal at JEA should be over the Vogel nuclear plant deal.)

JTA actually spent north of $65 million and counting on its wasteful projects PLUS lost the $147 million Fed dollars for the Emerald Trail.  And, they lost about $15 million a year supporting NAVI and the Skyway. And, tens of millions more mismanaging JTA. That's easily over $250 million in taxpayer CASH out the door.  If Nat Ford hadn't left and the "hidden" losses hadn't surfaced, all in with the above, JTA could have blown way over $400 to $600 million unchecked.  And, that doesn't count opportunity costs arising from a poorly run bus system or the lack of other useful mass transit options that could have been benefiting the City's economy. 

So, based on a CASH basis, one has to conclude that the ACTUAL lasting damage from JTA is far worse than JEA.

[jaxlongtimer]

I will say, if they inflated the Skyway and NAVI numbers, it could be another nail in the coffin for both of them if they aren't already on life support.  I could see them both sink or swim together, not separately, since NAVI was to be integrated into the Skyway as a justification to keep investing in both of them AND JTA managed/mismanaged both projects.  Vultures may not be willing to separate the two at this point.

Inflated projections are also what led to both of these projects being funded over the years in the first place.  Deflating the publicized numbers, already well below those funding projections, serves to support even more the resistance to continuing to invest in them.

I can't imagine any elected official, today, sticking their neck out to advocate for spending hundreds of millions on these projects with this context and in this economic and political environment.

You know by now my position... good riddance to both of them. 

I know your position, but you're latching on to anything to lead to a preconceived opinion. The investigation doesn't go back to a decade ago, when the Skyway was operating at its peak before the U2C/Navi debacle. End of the day, Jax has to get JTA fixed.

A decade ago, and for the entire life of the Skyway, it has failed to come anywhere near the traffic projections used to initiate the project.  What you call "peak" is still totally inadequate against the projections used to justify the Skyway.  I brought them up to give context to how low, today and always, the traffic numbers are, even as inflated, vs. any measure used to justify continuing it.

The only point I can understand, maybe, to support the Skyway is making use of the river crossing.  That said, I have yet to see a case that makes use of it in a feasible, cost effective, efficient manner.  You could run a lot of buses over the bridges for just the cost of interest on financing the Skyway's capex to repurpose the crossings.  Let's start with a robust shuttle between the Southbank/San Marco and Downtown and see what demand there is for that.  It could go far more places than the Skyway, carry more people, make more headways, cost far less to operate and support, and be implemented on only a few days notice if desired.  I would suggest the same model could replace the Skyway everywhere else it runs and beyond.

P.S.  I also get the "sex appeal" of an above grade track but Jax is so far from having Downtown traffic making that necessary or worthwhile, I don't see that investment to sustain same justifiable in the next few decades. FYI, I find I can drive through the heart of Downtown in the middle of any weekday in less than 5 minutes.  It's quicker than driving the same distance in the suburbs  .

[Charles Hunter]

A decade ago, and for the entire life of the Skyway, it has failed to come anywhere near the traffic projections used to initiate the project.  What you call "peak" is still totally inadequate against the projections used to justify the Skyway.  I brought them up to give context to how low, today and always, the traffic numbers are, even as inflated, vs. any measure used to justify continuing it.

The only point I can understand, maybe, to support the Skyway is making use of the river crossing.  That said, I have yet to see a case that makes use of it in a feasible, cost effective, efficient manner.  You could run a lot of buses over the bridges for just the cost of interest on financing the Skyway's capex to repurpose the crossings.  Let's start with a robust shuttle between the Southbank/San Marco and Downtown and see what demand there is for that.  It could go far more places than the Skyway, carry more people, make more headways, cost far less to operate and support, and be implemented on only a few days notice if desired.  I would suggest the same model could replace the Skyway everywhere else it runs and beyond.

P.S.  I also get the "sex appeal" of an above grade track but Jax is so far from having Downtown traffic making that necessary or worthwhile, I don't see that investment to sustain same justifiable in the next few decades. FYI, I find I can drive through the heart of Downtown in the middle of any weekday in less than 5 minutes.  It's quicker than driving the same distance in the suburbs  .

From the mid 1970s to when the Skyway crossed the river, JTA ran three downtown shuttle bus routes, one went near Five Points via Riverside, one to remote parking lots in the Sports Complex, and one crossed the Main Street Bridge to the Southbank. This route served MOSH/Friendship Park, west to the old Prudential building and Baptist Hospital, then east along Prudential Drive (serving park-ride lots on either side of South Main Street), the hotel (then a Sheraton) on what is now Riverplace Blvd., then back to the Main Street Bridge via (then called) Gulf Life Drive (serving the Gulf Life tower and the Hilton Hotel).

There were two operational problems with this route: the FECRR would block the buses, sometimes for long periods; and, less frequently, raising the Main Street Bridge for boats. The Skyway doesn't have those problems. These issues made keeping consistent headways difficult to impossible. Instead of buses coming every 10 minutes (or whatever), there would be two buses together, then 20-30 minutes until the next bus.

After the Skyway began service to the Southbank, JTA ran a shuttle to the San Marco shopping area. Again, the FECRR made this service unreliable, especially at lunch time, and it was dropped.

[Ken_FSU]

The NextEra offer would have generated approximately $6.45 billion in net proceeds for Jacksonville. Under Curry's proposal, roughly $2.2 billion would have been used to eliminate City debt, leaving approximately $4.25 billion available for investment or other public purposes. At the time, JEA was contributing roughly $120 million annually to the City's general fund. It would take more than 35 years of $120 million annual contributions just to equal $4.25 billion and that ignores the investment earnings that $4.25 billion could have generated. On top of that, eliminating approximately $2.2 billion in City debt was projected to save roughly $240 million annually in debt service.

Even with the PUP, Jax would have been incredibly cash flush with no debts and able to make some major capital investments. MOSH funding? No problem. Larger match to get UF here quicker? No worries. Incentives for corporate relocations? Easy.

Fully agree that, in a city where no one wants to pay for anything, JEA privatization is a conversation that should have been explored, and it's a shame that the well was so badly poisoned by Curry, Zahn, Baker and the like that we probably won't be able to have honest talks about the idea for a long, long time to come. Unfortunate, because I can't imagine bids coming in as high in 2026 with Plant Vogtle pulling things down.

I've gone back and forth on whether it's the right move. I think Curry's framing, and the above math, does leave out an important piece. Jacksonville's got ~$2 billion in bonded debt, which a JEA sale could have wiped out. But we'll never be debt-free as a city when we're sitting underneath another $3 billion in pension obligations. Depending on how you do the math, your trust in Jacksonville's leadership to properly steward that money (my trust is less than 0%), and our confidence that NextEra won't look to recoup their full purchase price at the expense of ratepayers, that lump sum could turn into less a windfall that propels Jacksonville into the future, and more a high-interest loan the city taken out against its own citizens' future utility payments.

Would love to see an independent analysis by an outside party, just so we know what we're sitting on.

[thelakelander]

^Local history has proven that the people in charge and influence would have siphoned most of that JEA money. So the windfall without ethics is a bit fool's gold. I'll reiterate with JTA specifically, just clean house at the executive level, right the ship and then we can talk and plan for the future in an unbiased way. We're just not going to get there with the same people who put the organization in the $40 million deficit, remaining in place.

[thelakelander]

A decade ago, and for the entire life of the Skyway, it has failed to come anywhere near the traffic projections used to initiate the project.  What you call "peak" is still totally inadequate against the projections used to justify the Skyway.  I brought them up to give context to how low, today and always, the traffic numbers are, even as inflated, vs. any measure used to justify continuing it.

I don't care what projections were in the 1970s. At that time, downtown was dense and there were several more thousand people living in LaVilla, Brooklyn, Springfield, Hansontown, Cathedral Hill, etc. in addition to several thousand more Northbank corporate officies. Heck, back then, the shipyards was still around and employing nearly a thousand. That downtown died a long time ago, fueled by local public policy and money that flowed from the core, right out to JTB and the Southside. Understanding the history and relationship of mass transit and land use policy is important.

My general point in mentioning this, is that Skyway ridership numbers were around 5,000 people per day in 2015, that's not under investigation and JTA wasn't in a $40 million hole back then. If we ever got around to coordinating fixed transit operations with supporting land use policies and TOD (like cities so where fixed transit works), the ridership would be higher because you'd develop your system to feed riders into transit spines that may cost more to operate, but move masses of people more efficiently. So I'd be slow to say its the reason JTA suddenly found itself in this financial situation. If we're honest with its ridership, I'd be surprised if any bus route in town actually moves 5,000 people a day now. The entire system is a problem and its on fumes because of horrible management from executive leadership.

The only point I can understand, maybe, to support the Skyway is making use of the river crossing.  That said, I have yet to see a case that makes use of it in a feasible, cost effective, efficient manner.  You could run a lot of buses over the bridges for just the cost of interest on financing the Skyway's capex to repurpose the crossings.

Take the name "Skyway" away from the conversation. Its a transit bridge over the river. While repurposing it into a sidewalk would be crazy (we'd still need to build a new transit bridge over the river and it would cost hundreds of millions to convert to/maintain a sidewalk), honest conversations about the future of mass transit in this town should include taking advantage of existing infrastructure and amenities....(like a transit bridge that would cost hundreds of millions today to rebuild or replace). That includes the elevated transit line and its stations. However, I don't think we can have that discussion right now without first overhauling JTA.

Let's start with a robust shuttle between the Southbank/San Marco and Downtown and see what demand there is for that.  It could go far more places than the Skyway, carry more people, make more headways, cost far less to operate and support, and be implemented on only a few days notice if desired.  I would suggest the same model could replace the Skyway everywhere else it runs and beyond.

A bunch of buses don't stimulate TOD and the additional economic positives that comes from that type of infill development. TOD is an additional revenue stream that can help support transit services. Overhaul JTA executive leadership first and then we can honestly evaluate future transit services citywide and how land use policies can be coordinated to achieve a certain type of vision where ridership supports our transit investments.

P.S.  I also get the "sex appeal" of an above grade track but Jax is so far from having Downtown traffic making that necessary or worthwhile, I don't see that investment to sustain same justifiable in the next few decades. FYI, I find I can drive through the heart of Downtown in the middle of any weekday in less than 5 minutes.  It's quicker than driving the same distance in the suburbs  .

Fixed transit investment and supporting land use policies go hand-in-hand. Future evaluation needs to prioritize this basic planning concept.

[CityLife]

The NextEra offer would have generated approximately $6.45 billion in net proceeds for Jacksonville. Under Curry's proposal, roughly $2.2 billion would have been used to eliminate City debt, leaving approximately $4.25 billion available for investment or other public purposes. At the time, JEA was contributing roughly $120 million annually to the City's general fund. It would take more than 35 years of $120 million annual contributions just to equal $4.25 billion and that ignores the investment earnings that $4.25 billion could have generated. On top of that, eliminating approximately $2.2 billion in City debt was projected to save roughly $240 million annually in debt service.

Even with the PUP, Jax would have been incredibly cash flush with no debts and able to make some major capital investments. MOSH funding? No problem. Larger match to get UF here quicker? No worries. Incentives for corporate relocations? Easy.

I've gone back and forth on whether it's the right move. I think Curry's framing, and the above math, does leave out an important piece. Jacksonville's got ~$2 billion in bonded debt, which a JEA sale could have wiped out. But we'll never be debt-free as a city when we're sitting underneath another $3 billion in pension obligations. Depending on how you do the math, your trust in Jacksonville's leadership to properly steward that money (my trust is less than 0%), and our confidence that NextEra won't look to recoup their full purchase price at the expense of ratepayers, that lump sum could turn into less a windfall that propels Jacksonville into the future, and more a high-interest loan the city taken out against its own citizens' future utility payments.

Would love to see an independent analysis by an outside party, just so we know what we're sitting on.

Totally get the skepticism based on how poorly everything is run in Jax. Because of that getting the City out of the utility business is a great thing, imo. JEA made massive mistakes with coal plants in the 80's. It had to retire the SJR Power Park early. Vogtle is a huge mistake. JEA is incredibly far behind at deploying solar and battery storage.

If you adjust on a pro-rata basis based on peak electric demand between the two entities, FPL has 20x more solar output than JEA and 50 times more battery than JEA and I'm sure that gap is growing wider and wider based on what FPL is bringing online.

FPL is simply in an different class than JEA is. Its parent company NextEra is the largest publicly traded company by market cap in Florida and is the largest energy company in the US (not counting oil companies). NextEra is on the cutting edge of everything in the energy industry. It will likely always be 5-10 years ahead of JEA technology wise for these reasons.

Because of that and the sheer scale of the company it's able to provide energy at substantially lower costs than JEA is. Even as a private company with profit margins, FPL's utility rates are lower than JEA. Right now FPL is .5% cheaper. The Florida Public Service Commission also regulates rates, so FPL is limited in how much it can increase rates.

There is certainly a risk that private ownership could ultimately result in higher rates as NextEra seeks to earn a return on its investment. But in my opinion, there is a greater risk that Jaxons remain exposed to the consequences of poor governance, bad financial decisions and future management mistakes under JEA. Unfortunately, due to Zahn, Curry, and Co it will never be on the table anytime soon again.

[tufsu1]

I don't think it's crazy to suggest this is a JEA level story at all. How much do you value the lost Emerald Trail contract? Add it all up & the loss here is easily $100M+.

You mean the grant WON in part by JTA?

The same grant that was rescinded by a federal government that rescinded countless similar projects nationwide - like the Underdeck in Miami?

[jaxlongtimer]

^Local history has proven that the people in charge and influence would have siphoned most of that JEA money. So the windfall without ethics is a bit fool's gold. I'll reiterate with JTA specifically, just clean house at the executive level, right the ship and then we can talk and plan for the future in an unbiased way. We're just not going to get there with the same people who put the organization in the $40 million deficit, remaining in place.

Ennis, agree on this.  Sell JEA and a few years later, we will be back to square one without its contribution to the City coffers and taxpayers asking where all the billions went.  JEA is likely the only City asset (not counting City departments like Building and Zoning, Planning, Property Appraiser, Tax Collector, Parking, etc.) that actually both pays for itself AND returns a "profit" directly back to the City.  Can't say that about the stadium, arena, ballpark, any park, JTA, JPA, JAA, convention center, new jail, courthouse, etc.

Further, aside from the current pension underfunding, which supposedly (but likely falsely) Curry addressed with his deferred sales tax (which is resulting in more additions to the underfunding to be covered), even if the pension was moved to a 401K style plan or the State's pension plan, the obligation to stay on top of it going forward will forever remain and, thus, eat up even more of any available resources the City has.

So, using JEA sale proceeds to cover pension obligations rather than current revenues doesn't solve anything, it just delays the return to the present state of underfunded obligations.  The City needs to discipline itself to pay for current obligations in the current budget cycle and stop kicking cans down the road to cover the sins of current elected officials.  If that means cutting expenses and/or raising taxes to balance each years budget, so be it.

Borrowing from the future for non-capital expenses is foolhardy, akin to going into long term debt to pay for this year's vacation and continuing to do so year after year until.... you owe lots of debt and can no longer put off paying it down.

[jaxlongtimer]

There were two operational problems with this route: the FECRR would block the buses, sometimes for long periods; and, less frequently, raising the Main Street Bridge for boats. The Skyway doesn't have those problems. These issues made keeping consistent headways difficult to impossible. Instead of buses coming every 10 minutes (or whatever), there would be two buses together, then 20-30 minutes until the next bus.

After the Skyway began service to the Southbank, JTA ran a shuttle to the San Marco shopping area. Again, the FECRR made this service unreliable, especially at lunch time, and it was dropped.

Charles, three points:

First, buses can use the Acosta or Fuller Warren bridges today.  Neither goes up for boats since being rebuilt from the 1970's.

Second, the Skyway does not cross any railroad tracks so it has no advantage over buses in that regard.

Third, supposedly after spending a few million dollars, the "San Marco train" holdups were reduced or eliminated.  I would add it's hard to go far anywhere in Jacksonville and not encounter a rail crossing.  It's part of what built this City and remains integral to its fabric.  We just need to learn to live with it on some level.  Maybe JTA could even talk with FEC/CSX/NS (wouldn't that be amazing to see!) to learn their train schedules and run buses around them.

[thelakelander]

^If we ever get to the point of where we can evaluate the overall transit network in an open-minded fashion, it could make sense to extend elevated Skyway infrastructure a few hundred feet south in San Marco to get over the FEC.

[jaxlongtimer]

^If we ever get to the point of where we can evaluate the overall transit network in an open-minded fashion, it could make sense to extend elevated Skyway infrastructure a few hundred feet south in San Marco to get over the FEC.

Looking at Google maps, I don't see an easy way to do that.  What path would you take and where would you put the terminal station? 

The best I could see is having it thread the Hilton hotel driveway, cross the retention pond and Kings Road, the railroad, the JEA utilities and land behind the public library.  That's not the most accessible spot.  Would the track have to be raised higher than normal to bridge over the rails to allow for double stacked container rail cars?  Is there room for track separation at the terminal station and for a crossover for vehicle reversals?  Looks very tight to me if it is at all doable.  And, all this at what cost vs. benefit?  The ongoing curse of the Skyway in my book.

[thelakelander]

^Straight south over Kings and FEC, then immediately drop to grade and terminate at Atlantic Blvd (Between FEC tracks and Southern Grounds) with a ground level no frills boarding platform. It was a part of the 2030 COJ Mobility Plan (completed back in 2010).

As a part of a regional approach (the 2030 Mobility Plan also included streetcar lines, BRT, and commuter rail lines), it was the most logical amd affordable way to provide a premium grade separated transit option over the FEC to connect San Marco to the larger regional network. Unlike what JTA continued to do, eventually blowing their stash with NAVI, it wasn't looked at as an isolated one-off option.

In this sense, forget about the name and type of vehicle running on top of the infrastructure. Instead, focus on how to make existing infrastructure work as a part of a much larger regional strategy.