Chinese fighter intercepts Navy Poseidon

[spuwho]

No doubt, he is right.  Where opposition was fractured before, its coalescing now.

Its 1931 all over again. Hopefully it wont lead to another Mukden Incident and another Lytton Report.

[spuwho]

At the planned Shangri-La conference in Singapore, it seems everyone got the stress off their chest.  After the US criticized some of the other countries involved, China applauded our attitude adjustment.

Per Reuters:

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/31/us-asia-security-china-idUSKBN0OG02320150531

China, U.S. tone down rhetoric but far from South China Sea solution



After a months-long row over Beijing's island-building in the South China Sea, the United States and China were relatively restrained at Asia's top security forum this weekend, but no closer to any solution.

U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter told the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore that China was threatening security in the region with its maritime construction work, but acknowledged other claimant countries to the disputed sea were also at fault.

"There's no progress in the South China Sea (dispute), but the atmosphere has calmed a bit, thanks to reasonable consideration by all parties," said Major General Jin Yinan of China's National Defense University, a delegate at the conference. "The U.S. has adjusted its stance a little."

Admiral Sun Jianguo, a deputy chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army who headed the Chinese delegation, refrained from singling out the United States for criticism in his address and emphasized China's commitment to peaceful relations.

"China has always kept in mind the larger interests of maritime security," Sun said, reiterating that his country's "indisputable" claims over the waters were based on legal and historical evidence.

Nevertheless, Washington is under huge pressure to respond forcefully to the Chinese land reclamation, with Republican Senator John McCain, one of the participants at the dialogue, suggesting that U.S. ships and aircraft ignore the 12-nautical mile zone around the artificial islands.

"If we respected a 12-mile zone, then we would be making a mistake of enormous proportions because that would be de facto recognition of Chinese sovereignty," said McCain, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

If U.S. vessels enter the zone, tensions would escalate sharply and there is no saying how Chinese forces based there would respond.

"If you look at the rhetoric, they are going to fight back," said Jia Qingguo, Dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University. "If you look at their interests, they may opt for rhetoric instead of action. But here the danger is of an accident-led conflict."

Admiral Harry Harris, newly appointed chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, told reporters his forces would continue to operate in the region "without limitation and in accordance with international law."

But he also said he wanted increased military-to-military ties with China, including the U.S.-led Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) joint naval exercises in 2016.

McCain and other critics of the administration have said China should be barred from RIMPAC to show U.S. disapproval of its actions.

AIR DEFENSE ZONE PROSPECTS

China also signaled it was not considering declaring an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), which requires overflying aircraft to identify themselves, around the disputed islands anytime soon.

Such a move, which some U.S. military experts have seen as increasingly likely, would be viewed as provocative by Washington.

Sun said a decision on an ADIZ would be taken after an assessment of the security situation and taking "extensive factors" into consideration.

Jin, the major general, told Reuters Beijing was not planning such a move, although he added: "It's not a permanent promise, it's just China is not considering it at the moment."

Other countries participating in the dialogue warned the row could spiral out of control and called for responsible action.

Washington wants more Asian countries, including those from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to be more assertive against what it sees as Chinese expansionism.

But even Vietnam, which claims islands in the area where China is doing the reclamation work, said the major powers should have good relations with each other, otherwise smaller nations would suffer.

"No country in the region wants to choose between China and the United States," said Bonnie Glaser, a senior adviser at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.

"If the United States is too tough on China, then we run the risk of losing some of the members, especially ASEAN."

[finehoe]

China is not the only country reclaiming land in South China Sea

It's time to get the facts straight on the military activities of all countries in the Spratly Islands before Washington intensifies its confrontation with China over Beijing's intentions.

The headlines have been about China's reclamation of some 2,000 acres from the South China Sea over the past 18 months and building military facilities on them.

Less attention has been paid — except by the Chinese — to smaller but similar reclamation and military construction efforts over the years and currently by Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia, related to islands they claim in the Spratlys.

Taiwan, for example, has claimed Itu Aba Island since 1955, one of the largest in the Spratlys. It served as a Japanese submarine base during World War II and today tankers carrying most of China's imported oil pass nearby.

In 2008, Taiwan announced a new 3,900-foot airstrip had been completed on the island that would support search and rescue operations. It also could support military aircraft, as Taiwan's president proved that year when he landed in a C-130 transport plane.

The island now has a radar station, meteorological center and permanent troop support facilities for a Taiwanese marine unit.

More recently, Taiwan has begun a modest reclamation effort near the airstrip, which may be part of a proposed $100 million port designed to handle frigates and coast guard cutters.

Vietnam also has been expanding its holdings in the Spratlys, which lie just seven miles east of Taiwan's Itu Aba Island and were first occupied in 1975. On Sand Cay and West London Reef, Vietnam has been reclaiming land from the sea to build military facilities but at about one-tenth the size of China's project.

West London Reef's eastern sandbank has been expanded by two square miles and work on a harbor facility is underway, according to a study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). On the southern portion a fourth structure is joining three multi-story military facilities. Another is going up in the northern portion.

A surveillance facility sits at the eastern side of Sand Cay with a heliport next to it. The Vietnamese are also constructing a pier and a complex of defense structures, including what may be artillery emplacements bunkers, according to the CSIS .

On the Spratly Island of Zhongye Dao, the Philippine government has had a military airstrip since 1975 known as Ranudo Air Field. The Philippine air force announced in June 2014 that $11 million had been allocated to upgrade the 4,200-foot runway and navy port facilities. Aside from the air field, which has been able to accommodate C-130s since 2002, the island has a military detachment and small civilian population.

Malaysia is also in the Spratly picture. In early 2013, the Chinese held naval exercises near James Shoals, a reef some 50 miles off Malaysia's Borneo state of Sarawak, which Malaysia claims and is considered part of the Spratlys. In October 2013, Malaysian Defense Minister Hishamuddin Hussein announced his country's plan to establish a marine corps that would be stationed at a new naval base to be constructed at Bintulu in Sarawak.

On Saturday, at the International Institute for Strategic Studies Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter acknowledged, "It's true that almost all the nations that claim parts of the South China Sea have developed outposts over the years . . . of differing scope and degree."

Although Carter described China as "one country [that] has gone much further and much faster than any other," he added, "We also oppose any further militarization of disputed features."

Carter meant China and everyone else, but that may prove difficult for the United States to accomplish.

As the defense secretary pointed out, as Asian-Pacific "nations develop, as military spending increases, and as economies thrive — we expect to see changes in how countries define and pursue their interests and ambitions."

The United States, for example, is increasing its military presence in the area, though its mainland is 7,000 miles away and its closest states, Alaska and Hawaii, are 4,500 and 6,000 miles away respectively.

On Wednesday, Carter pointed out the "tremendous" U.S. forces already in the region: more than 350,000 military and civilian personnel, nearly 2,000 aircraft and 180 naval vessels.

On Saturday, he said, "As the United States develops new systems, [the Defense Department] will continue to bring the best platforms and people forward to the Asia-Pacific."

Meanwhile, the Chinese in their military white paper released Tuesday took a different view of the U.S. presence and its activities. In the paper, Beijing took aim at "some external countries" — no names mentioned — that "are also busy meddling in South China Sea affairs," along with "a tiny few [who] maintain constant close-in air and sea surveillance and reconnaissance against China."

Should Americans be surprised that China says it is reorienting "from theater defense to trans-theater mobility," from solely "offshore waters defense" to "open seas protection" and moving from "territorial air defense to both [air force] defense and offense?"

The Defense Department's report on China's military, released May 8, calmly says, "China seeks to ensure basic stability along its periphery and avoid direct confrontation with the United States in order to focus on domestic development and smooth China's rise."

If true, it appears that Carter will prove correct when he said Wednesday in Hawaii: "We will remain the principal security power in the Asia-Pacific for decades to come."

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/china-is-not-the-only-country-reclaiming-land-in-south-china-sea/2015/06/01/38817a58-0569-11e5-a428-c984eb077d4e_story.html

[Ocklawaha]

It's the Marco Polo Bridge -v- Kwantung Army all over again!

[spuwho]

The biggest difference is that Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia and Phillippines do not warn overflying aircraft they are in a military zone. They have been around for various amounts of time, but they dont threaten people when they come around.

That is what differentiates the Chinese response.

[BridgeTroll]

The biggest difference is that Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia and Phillippines do not warn overflying aircraft they are in a military zone. They have been around for various amounts of time, but they dont threaten people when they come around.

That is what differentiates the Chinese response.

Well that... and those countries are geographically close to the reefs being destroyed.  Many of them within actual territorial waters...  The article fails to mention most of the disputed reefs are 400-500 miles from China...  A simple look at the map shows those small countries claims as fairly reasonable while China's claim is... outlandishly huge. 

The pink line is China's claim...

[BridgeTroll]

http://www.janes.com/article/51939/philippines-making-progress-with-new-naval-base-near-spratlys

Philippines making progress with new naval base near Spratlys

Michael Cohen, Manila and James Hardy, London - IHS Jane's Navy International

01 June 2015

The Philippine Navy (PN) has released images of the first major access road to a pier being built in Oyster Inlet on the South China Sea side of Palawan Island.

Oyster Inlet, which is in Ulugan Bay and 18 km from Naval Station Carlito Cunanan, has been the site of a small pier and fresh water station since the 1950s. It is being expanded into a major naval anchorage along with three other nearby coves.

The expansion of Oyster Inlet was announced during a 2013 visit to the Ulugan Bay area by President Benigno Aquino. A PN statement released on 29 May described the building of the road network as a part of a three-year development that will make Oyster Inlet a major naval anchorage for the PN and "visiting allies".

A project development programme report describes a facility that will have a secure helipad, barracks, and amphibious jungle warfare training centre in the surrounding area of the peninsula. A coast watch radar station and communications centre is to be built on hills overlooking the site along with a defensive network of armed outposts and monitoring systems.

While most of the plans are classified, sources have suggested that an area forward joint operations centre for visiting "security and treaty partners" of the Philippines will also be built.

http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1533861/philippines-us-fortifying-military-base-near-disputed-islands-amid-chinese?comment-sort=recommended&edition=hong-kong

Philippines turning Ulugan Bay, Palawan, from sleepy village to military base

Manila seeks to shore up its South China Sea defences - with the help of its US allies

As fears grow that China is on an aggressive South China Sea territorial grab, a sleepy Philippine village is being transformed into a major naval base that may host US warships.

Ulugan Bay, a small, picturesque cove encircled by thick mangroves, has suddenly become a vital part of the Philippine military's efforts to shore up its defence of contested South China Sea islands and waters.

Ulugan is on the west coast of the large western Philippine island of Palawan, only 160 kilometres from a small group of islands and islets within the Spratly archipelago known locally as the Kalayaan group.

The Spratlys are among the most prized assets in the decades-long but increasingly hostile struggle for control of parts of the South China Sea.

"This is the frontline of our territorial defence operations in the Kalayaan island group," President Benigno Aquino declared last month as he inspected the progress of a recently announced upgrade of a tiny naval station on the bay.

The sea has such importance because roughly half the world's shipping trade passes through it, while it is believed to contain enormous deposits of natural gas and has rich fishing grounds.

China and Taiwan say they have sovereign rights to nearly all of the sea, conflicting with the claims of the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei to areas closer to their coasts.

The Philippines and Vietnam have expressed growing alarm in recent years at China's increasingly assertive tactics to stake its claims.

Most recently, the Philippines has accused China of reclaiming land at tiny reefs in the Spratlys to in effect create artificial islands that may be used to build air strips and other military installations.

US security blanket

In direct response to the fears over China, the Philippines has sought help from long-time ally the United States to bolster its poorly equipped armed forces with new hardware and training.

The Philippines and the United States also signed a new security pact when US President Barack Obama visited Manila in April that would soon allow a much greater American military presence on Filipino soil, including on expanded bases.

At Ulugan Bay, there is currently just a tiny naval station that serves as the command centre for the Filipino military unit responsible for safeguarding its South China Sea waters.

A small pier stands at the bay's most prized asset, a deep inlet called Oyster Bay with rich fishing grounds that help sustain the 1,700 residents of the nearby village of Macarascas.

As part of the upgrade, a much bigger pier, harbour and support facilities are being built to serve as a base for the navy's largest vessels, including two ex-US frigates acquired since 2011.

Aquino said the upgrade would also allow the navy to monitor ships by radar and conduct maritime surveillance through a satellite-based system.

However just 500 million pesos (US$11.4 million) is being spent on the Ulugan upgrade and analysts say the Philippines will not come close to having the capabilities to deter China, which spent US$119.5 billion on its military last year.

"I expect the strategy will allow the Philippine Navy to conduct limited defensive, small-boat missions," Roilo Golez, a former legislator and national security adviser, said.

A potential game changer, however, could be the addition of American troops and hardware, along with extra US money to further expand the facility.

Under the "enhanced defence cooperation agreement" signed between the treaty allies in April, US forces will have access to five Philippine military bases, allowing them to build facilities and rotate through thousands of troops. It will also allow the United States to deploy more aircraft, ships and equipment to these bases.

The Philippines has so far publicly offered the United States renewed access to Subic Bay, a former US naval base about 100 kilometres north of Manila that also projects onto the South China Sea.

It has not yet said Ulugan Bay will be used, and an announcement on which five bases have been chosen is not expected before October. But there are signs that Ulugan Bay will be chosen.

Macarascas residents said the US military had already built a gymnasium, a multi-purpose building and a water storage facility, suggesting this was part of their bedding-in with the community.

[BridgeTroll]

Best graphic I have found... 

[finehoe]

^^^Where's it from?

[BridgeTroll]

http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:South_China_Sea_vector.svg

http://news.bbcimg.co.uk/media/images/48951000/gif/_48951920_south_china-sea_1_466.gif

[BridgeTroll]

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-warns-japan-stay-out-south-china-sea-13102

China Warns Japan to Stay out of South China Sea
Zachary Keck
June 12, 2015

China is "gravely concerned and indignant" over Japan's plans to step patrols in the South China Sea.

In a regular scheduled press conference on Friday, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson, Hong Lei, warned Japan to stay out of the South China Sea dispute.

"The Chinese side is gravely concerned and indignant about the negative moves of the Japanese side. We have lodged multiple solemn representations with Japan," Hong stated.

He went on to say:

Japan is not a party concerned to the South China Sea issue. Recently it has behaved in an abnormal way, deliberately thrust a hand in the South China Sea issue, driven a wedge among regional countries and maliciously created tensions in the South China Sea. Japan's moves do no good to solve the South China Sea disputes, or safeguard peace and stability of the South China Sea. It also severely damages the political and security mutual trust between China and Japan, and runs counter to the momentum of improving bilateral relations. We once again urge the Japanese side to abide by its commitment of not taking sides on the South China Sea disputes, put an immediate end to the hyping up of the South China Sea issue and groundless accusations against China, stop provoking conflicts among different parties for self-serving interests, genuinely maintain the momentum of improving Sino-Japanese relations and respect the efforts by China and ASEAN countries to safeguard peace and stability of the South China Sea.

The spokesperson's comments come on the heels of Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Forces announcing it will hold a joint military exercise with the Philippines in the South China Sea later this month.

"We will announce the details such as the schedule and assets we will send as soon as the plan is fixed," Tomohisa Takei, chief of staff for the Maritime Self-Defense Force, told Japanese reporters earlier this week. Nonetheless, Japanese media outlets have reported that Tokyo will dispatch a P3-C Orion patrol aircraft for the exercise.

Last month, Japan sent two destroyers to the South China Sea to hold a one-day exercise with the Philippines, which reportedly had one of its newest warships participate. That exercise took place just 300 kilometers away from the Scarborough Shoal, which China seized from the Philippines in 2011.

The United States strongly backs Japan's participation in the South China Sea, and in fact has reportedly proposed joint U.S.-Japanese patrols in the area.

In an interview with Reuters earlier this year, Admiral Robert Thomas, America's top naval officer in the Western Pacific, said that "I think that JSDF (Japan Maritime Self Defense Forces) operations in the South China Sea makes sense in the future." Thomas noted that Chinese capabilities in the region currently outmatch those of its neighbors, and therefore Southeast Asian nations see Japan as a stabilizing force.

The United States has also increased its calls for China to stop its reclamation projects in the South China Sea.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is currently trying to pass legislation that would give the JSDF the right to engage in "collective self-defense." This would significantly reduce the legal barriers inhibiting Japan's ability to play a military role in the South China Sea dispute.

Zachary Keck is managing editor of The National Interest. You can find him on Twitter: @ZacharyKeck.

[spuwho]

Nothing riles the Chinese more than the Japanese.

We can fly B52's through their ADIZ with a collective yawn, but if the JDSF does anything the Chinese does the diplomatic blitz.

[BridgeTroll]

http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/joint-japan-philippine-flight-over-south-china-sea-riles-china/

Joint Japan-Philippine Flight Over South China Sea Riles China

Once again, China is calling for Japan to stay out of the South China Sea issue.

By Shannon Tiezzi
June 25, 2015

A Japanese surveillance plane flew over disputed waters in the South China Sea on Tuesday, as part of joint drills with the Philippines. As The Diplomat reported previously, the Philippines is holding separate drills with the United States and Japan this week, with both exercises held near the South China Sea. The Japan-Philippine drill, only the second ever between the two countries, simulated maritime search and rescue operations, part of the drill's larger focus on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

As part of the drill, a Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) P3-C Orion surveillance plane flew past Reed Bank, an area claimed by both China and the Philippines. The Japanese plane carried three Philippine crew members on board as guests, and was accompanied by a Philippine patrol aircraft, Reuters reported.

Philippine Marine Colonel Jonas Lumawag, describing the drill, told reporters, "We practiced search and rescue patterns, which are essential in any humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations." According to Yomiuri Shimbun, the drill involved a mock search for a shipwrecked vessel. However, Yomiuri also noted that the Philippine officers on board were "apparently greatly impressed by the P-3C's excellent ability to detect submarines" – exactly the capability that makes China most nervous about U.S. P-3 patrols. In the post-drill press conference, Lumawag said that the Philippines is eager to learn from Japanese experience operating such surveillance planes.

Still, the Philippines was quick to note that the drills (both with Japan and with the United States) are not aimed at any specific country. "The Philippines has had these exercises before with our strategic partners. It should not be taken as an affront to any other and is an expression of cooperation and learning from all those involved," Deputy Presidential Spokesperson Abigail Valte told The Philippine Star. A Navy spokesperson agreed, saying, "We are doing this for interoperability" – not to send a message about the maritime disputes.

Still, experts believe the joint drill could be a precursor to Japanese joint patrols over the South China Sea, something the United States has expressed interest in before. "It's likely we will see Japan doing joint surveillance and reconnaissance in the South China Sea in the coming years... It is going to be with the U.S., Australia, the Philippines, and others," Narushige Michishita of the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo told the Associated Press.

China, for its part, continues to repeat its basic message to Japan: stay out of the South China Sea. A Xinhua commentary published before the joint drill actually took place called the exercise "the latest sequel to Tokyo's meddling in the South China Sea." The author, Wang Haiqing, noted several reasons for "Tokyo's recent obsession to meddle in the South China Sea": seeking to force China to divert resources from the East China Sea (where it has a territorial dispute with Japan) to the South China Sea; hoping to portray China as an aggressive "bully" in order to win more domestic support for the Abe administration's security and defense reforms; and trying to distract the world from historical issues regarding Japan's actions in World War II. "Japan, which is not a party to the disputes in South China Sea, should abandon all attempts to stir waves in the area," Wang concluded.

When asked if China is concerned about the joint Japan-Philippines drills, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lu Kang noted that "what the regional countries care most [about] is still the issue of development." He added, "We hope that relevant sides would not deliberately hype up or even create so-called tension in the region."

[finehoe]

What happens to a coral reef when an island is built on top?

Marine biologist John McManus, who has been studying Pacific coral reefs for the past 30 years, remembers a two-day boat journey a few years ago to a remote part of the Spratly Islands, a chain of low-lying coral and rocky reefs in the South China Sea.

"You are traveling along in open ocean waters, then you come upon a place where the waves are breaking, then everything beyond the reef is flat, like a giant pool," said McManus, who is director of the National Center for Coral Reef Research at the University of Miami.

Today, seven such coral reefs are being turned into islands, with harbors and landing strips, by the Chinese military. Not only is this work threatening China's relations with the United States and several other Pacific nations, it is also destroying a rich ecological network, according to McManus.

"This is devastating," he said. "It's the worst thing that has happened to coral reefs in our lifetime." U.S. officials estimate that the Chinese military has built up the shallow tropical seafloor with reclaimed sand, steel, wood and concrete barriers to create 2,000 acres of new territory.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/what-happens-to-a-coral-reef-when-an-island-is-built-on-top/2015/07/06/d409493c-168b-11e5-9518-f9e0a8959f32_story.html

[BridgeTroll]

http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/regaining-the-initiative-in-the-south-china-sea/

Regaining the Initiative in the South China Sea

How the U.S. and its partners could provide a robust counter to the growing PRC presence in the South China Sea.

By Col Michael W. "Starbaby" Pietrucha
August 05, 2015

To endeavor to seize the strategic initiative in military struggle, proactively plan for military struggle in all directions and domains, and grasp the opportunities to accelerate military building, reform and development.

- Chinese Military Strategy, Chinese Ministry of National Defense, May 26, 2015.

On May 26, the State Council Information Office released an English-language version of the Chinese Military Strategy. Short, sweet, and immensely more readable than its American counterpart, the PRC's military strategy is notable for its transition to an overt, "active defense" posture for Chinese military forces. Among the many salient points is the emphasis on gaining the strategic initiative, which is one of eight specified strategic tasks for the Chinese military.

This is not a new development, but recent activities in the South China Sea (SCS) illustrate the reality that China has already seized the strategic initiative in those waters. Force dispositions in the SCS make it clear that the PRC has no intention of surrendering the initiative. A passive U.S. response will only continue to demonstrate to China the usefulness of its approach, while traditional flexible deterrent options are both unnecessarily provocative and likely to be ineffective. A comprehensive, long-term engagement and modernization strategy focused on Partner Nation (PN) and U.S. airpower may provide an opportunity for the U.S. to reverse PRC gains in the SCS and prevent further gains.

Airpower, particularly airpower employed by partner nations, is the necessary backbone of a strategy to effectively neutralize the political effectiveness of the PRC's island forts in the South China Sea. A robust engagement strategy, combined with a modernized American bomber force, will allow the United States to credibly project power or assist local defense efforts, even in cases where local basing for U.S. forces is unavailable. This proposed U.S. strategy has three elements; new defense relationships, a revised toolkit for building up partner nation air and seapower capabilities, and a modernized long-range bomber force.

Geography

Any discussion of the South China Sea has to start with the geography. China's claims essentially encompass the entire sea, based on the remnants of the 11-dash line inherited from the Republic of China in 1947. Now referred to as the "nine-dash line" (two were deleted by Zhou Enlai), the line encompasses territory that has historically been claimed or occupied by other nations, including marginal reefs, shoals, and sandbars. Some of those marginal points have been occupied by China and other nations with claims, and a number have been expanded into artificial islands complete with military facilities, including airfields.

While much has been said in the press about China's militarized artificial islands, fortified islands have all of the disadvantages of an aircraft carrier, without the mobility that makes the carrier worthwhile. As the Japanese discovered in WWII, fortified islands are locations where forces are dangerously concentrated into tight spaces with limited materiel, fuel and munitions. Militarily, small island bases are easy to isolate, hard to defend, and they concentrate forces in the most unfavorable manner – when they are most vulnerable to attack. They can easily be turned into a liability. In peacetime, by contrast, the bases are effective at expanding the ability of the PRC to observe, act and intimidate neighbors. The challenge, then, is how to neutralize their effect in peacetime.


Figure 1: PRC Map of the SCS showing the 9-dash line, submitted to the UN in 2009 (English labels added)

The South China Sea is commanded by the landmasses around it. No collection of small, static island bases will provide command of it. Vietnam, Borneo, Luzon and Palawan dominate the geography. South of the Paracels, Vietnam and the Philippines have a positional advantage over the SCS compared to mainland China or Hainan Island. Countries with substantial nearby territory, notably Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Brunei, have the potential to offset some of China's military advantages – but only if they can hold Chinese military elements at risk.

A New Defense Architecture

If we are to successfully contain the PRC's ambitions in the SCS, we will have to change the defense architecture in the region. Only four countries hold a commanding position over the SCS: China, Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines. Arguably, the PRC pairs the largest military with the poorest geographical position. A U.S. containment policy can be immeasurably improved with the addition of the active participation of one or more of these critical neighboring nations. Even without U.S. permanent basing, established defense relationships and an improved PN military posture can provide a bulwark against PRC aggression.

Vietnam, which has a thousand years of Chinese occupation in its history, is also the most recent victim of full-scale Chinese military aggression, having suffered an invasion by the PRC in 1979. Vietnam has also suffered more casualties in the South China Sea in direct conflict with China than any other nation. With a commanding position over the SCS, claims to the Paracel Islands and a robust basing structure, Vietnam is logically the highest-payoff country in the region with which to improve a defense relationship, with or without forward basing accessible to the U.S. The future of military cooperation is currently somewhat limited because Title 22 CFR 126.1 prohibits lethal military aid to Vietnam; waiving this prohibition with respect to maritime weapons systems has already allowed an expanded, if limited, defense relationship with Vietnam. The waiver could be expanded to encompass aviation capabilities, and Senator John McCain has announced a plan to introduce legislation that would remove CFR 126.1 restrictions on Vietnam.

Malaysia, which already has an existing security cooperation relationship with the U.S., commands the south approaches to the SCS via the island of Borneo. It maintains claims to some of the Spratly Islands, and exerts control over a number of reefs, shoals, and the airfield on Swallow Reef. There are seven militarily significant Malaysian airfields on Borneo, making it substantially more robust than any PRC landfill basing structure. The Royal Malayan Air Force operates a mix of modern U.S., Russian and European aircraft covering a wide range of roles. From an aviation standpoint, Malaysia has a small but capable Air Force, and a defense doctrine that has focused heavily on self-reliance.

The Philippines is the only one of the three partners bordering the SCS that has a mutual defense treaty with the United States, dating from 1961. Unfortunately, the Philippine Air Force is a shadow of the organization that the U.S. helped build up after Vietnam. Despite a 20-year old modernization plan, the Philippine Air Force lost its ability to operate jet fighters ten years ago and suffers from aging equipment, poor infrastructure, an ad hoc military procurement system and poor morale. In effect, the PAF is an internal security force and the Philippines is entirely dependent on the U.S. for external defense.

The Wolverine Strategy

The process of strengthening local partners to compete with a regional hegemon is often referred to as the "hedgehog" strategy. A hedgehog is a difficult challenge for a predator intent on a quick meal. A hedgehog doesn't have to be impossible to eat, it just has to be more difficult and less worthwhile than the other meal options. A wolverine, on the other hand, is a nasty, aggressive predator that is not only difficult to eat, but dangerous to be around and worth avoiding. A "wolverine" strategy, intended to improve the offensive counterair and countermaritime capabilities of partner nations, would hold part of the key to neutralizing China's initiative.

The PRC's claims in the SCS have no standing in international law, and only very tenuous historical backing. Many of the islands have been only occasionally inhabited for centuries, some remain claimed by the Republic of China, and some have been seized by force by the PRC. In 1974, the PRC seized the Crescent Group of the Paracels from the Republic of Vietnam. In 1994, Mischief Reef was occupied during a lull in Philippine Navy patrols and in 2012 the PRC abrogated a U.S.-brokered agreement which would have pulled back PLAN and Philippine Navy vessels. A three-year blockade of the Philippine Marine detachment on Second Thomas Shoal is ongoing. The PRC has been aggressive in pursuing SCS claims, not only within the 200-nm Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of other nations, but also within the territorial 12-mile limit of the Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia.

China is a signatory of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), but believes that it does not apply in the SCS. To date, none of the adjacent countries has resisted PRC encroachment militarily, with the notable exception of Vietnam. This can only change if those countries become strong enough to make PRC advances costly or easily reversed. For local defense within a country's EEZ, land-based airpower is the decisive force because Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia could all potentially maintain air superiority within 200nm of their shores, while China would be challenged to operate at a much longer distance. If the countries surrounding the SCS had robust, offensive air and sea capabilities, not only would they be better prepared to resist PRC aggression, they would also be able to reverse temporary gains and raise the costs of Chinese intervention.

U.S. participation in developing offensive air and sea capabilities is critical, but at this juncture not particularly feasible. The U.S. has no lethal, affordable and transferable air or naval systems that our regional partners can afford to purchase, operate and maintain in sufficient numbers. In the 1970s, the U.S. Air Force provided a large number of air forces worldwide with Vietnam-surplus aircraft to provide an effective bulwark against a common Communist-inspired threat. A-37s, F-5s, A-7s, C-7s, C-119s, C-123s, O-1s, O-2s and OV-10s were provided to a number of air forces. Those aircraft are now only marginally operational, if at all. The U.S. now have few alternatives to offer while, at the same time, demand for U.S. assistance with air forces is only growing. If a PN cannot afford an F-16 with a midlife upgrade, we cannot supply them with combat aircraft. Similarly, we do not build naval vessels that can be used effectively by less-capable partners – our best options are retired FFG-7 frigates and the occasional long-endurance cutter. Littoral combat ships are too expensive by an order of magnitude, and we do not build a surface combatant like the Pegasus-class hydrofoil, Skjold-class corvette, or Type 022 fast missile boat. If we were to attempt to execute a Wolverine Strategy, we are short the necessary tools – the U.S. will have difficulty providing common hardware, effective training, and the most important aspect of all – a long-term relationship that helps shape partner militaries to be a key ally for a global effort with values common to both.


Figure 2: PRC Claims in the SCS overlaid on 200 nm EEZ lines (Goran tek-en)

This is an acute problem in Southeast Asia, as U.S.-built combat aircraft have reached the end of their service lives. The last U.S. export fighter, the F-5E Tiger II, has so far been replaced by non-U.S. fighters, forfeiting a major security cooperation opportunity. The last remaining F-5s in Southeast Asia will retire in the next five years with no American replacement options except the much more expensive F-16, F-18 and F-15E.

If we are to successfully execute a Wolverine Strategy, we will have to do something about both our air advisory capability and our stable of available aircraft. Combat variants of the T-X trainer (AT-X and FT-X) might well serve as a mid-term, exportable fighter in the mid 2020s. Similarly, ACC's OA-X (AT-6B or A-29B) could help rebuild the essential skills needed by the Philippines to allow an effective transition to a multirole force – and those aircraft are ready today. If the U.S. were also to design and build small missile combatants akin to the PLAN's Type 022 Houbei-class, partner nations could add small, lethal combatants to the list of capabilities used to offset the PRC's current maritime superiority over other regional navies. Most importantly, we must accompany any advisory effort with a long-term commitment akin to Plan Colombia, which took a decade, but resulted in a well-equipped, thoroughly professional Fuerza Aérea Colombiana.

The Bombers

The final ingredient is a modernized long-range bomber force, consisting of LRS-B, B-2, and upgraded B-52J. (The B-1B is simply too fuel inefficient, and has such low availability ratings, to be cost-effective to keep in the inventory. The loss of B-1s will be offset by new LRS-B and by moving additional B-52 from storage into operational units.) The long distances typical of combat in the Pacific, and the increasing range of the PRC's missile threat, may necessitate operating from well outside the region. Bombers may operate from foreign locations such as RAAF Tindall or Diego Garcia, but a re-engined B-52J could also operate unrefueled into the SCS from distant bases like RAAF Amberly or U.S. territory such as Wake, Guam, or even Hawaii. With modernized sensor systems including inverse synthetic aperture (for ship identification) and pulse-Doppler (for air to air situational awareness) modes, the bombers will be able to support countermaritime operations in and around the South China Sea.

Against the Soviet Navy, a three-ship flight of Harpoon-armed B-52Gs was a formidable force, and might well have proven a dominant force in the North Atlantic. Armed with modern antiship weapons such as the Naval Strike Missile or improved Harpoon, a loaded flight of B-52s has the salvo size to overwhelm naval air defenses from standoff range. In addition to antisurface warfare, the large capacity of the bombers could allow effective isolation of PRC military island installations by direct attack from standoff, or employment of precision standoff aerial mining capabilities exemplified by Quickstrike-ER and Quickstrike-P. Isolating island bases by preventing their resupply could effectively neutralize them – airbases require a lot of fuel to be effective, and air defenses require power generation, which is also fuel-intensive. Island bases isolated by standoff mining of the nearby waters may not be able to redeploy their heavy military equipment, which can then be attacked at leisure.

The small, congested conditions on fortified islands limit the effectiveness of active defenses, which cannot rely on a mobility doctrine due to the small area and cannot rely on tight emissions control due to the lack of supporting, land-based infrastructure. Moreover, bases built on landfill cannot be effectively hardened with underground facilities – a condition that also bedevils U.S. island bases in the region. Any hit by a weapon on an artificial island base is likely to have an outsized effect due to the congestion of assets.

Conclusion

The steady advance of the PRC's territorial claims in the South China Sea has put the U.S. and partner nations at a disadvantage. China's incremental approach relies more on the advantages of position and the threat of military force, which is often threatened but rarely used. China is able to get away with this kind of behavior because the competing nations do not have a regional defense arrangement and because the imbalance in force size and capabilities is substantial. However, Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines do have substantial geographical advantages over China in that each of them, alone, has a commanding position over parts of the South China Sea. The three of them together, properly equipped and supported by the U.S., could provide a robust counter to any isolated military presence that the PLA might establish outside the Chinese EEZ.

A combination of improved defense relationships and U.S.-built air and sea capabilities backed by a modernized long-range strike capability from USAF bombers would require a substantial investment in time and resources, but does not place the burden for offsetting China's advances solely upon the United States. Given the rebalance to the Pacific, a robust engagement strategy is a necessary component of any U.S. effort to contain the PRC and assure Asian partners and allies that the rebalance is more than empty words. Airpower is a key component of this strategy and well-suited to the maritime challenges posed in the South China Sea.